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CHARGING THE JURY ON DAMAGES IN PERSONALINJURY CASES: HOW NEW YORK CAN BENEFIT
FROM THE ENGLISH PRACTICE

Charles D. Cole, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION

The trial of a personal-injury case to a jury is fraught with
uncertainty. Uncertainty stems from whether the plaintiff will prevail
(and whether the jury will find the defendant at fault) and the amount of
damages. Personal injuries, such as a broken ankle or a busted knee, do
not translate well into specific dollar awards. Awarding a sum of
money for a personal injury is firmly rooted in the law and is the only
means available to compensate the plaintiff for a loss. These means are
entrusted to the jury beginning at jury selection and continuing
throughout the trial.
Several consequences stem from the inability to translate a
personal injury into a specific dollar award. The first consequence is
that plaintiffs with roughly comparable injuries may receive less or
more damages than others who are similarly situated due to the
propensity of juries in one region to make either less or more generous
awards. But there is little justification to support awarding either less or
more compensation for an injury just because the claim is brought in
one part of the state instead of another.
Further, awarding unequal compensation for what is essentially the
same injury does not make sense from an institutional viewpoint.
Indeed, any significant variability in the award of damages may make
the settlement of claims more difficult, especially when dealing with
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) willing to run the risk of an adverse verdict
for the chance at a generous damage award. Moreover, a system in
which the prospect of an award of damages that is disproportionate to
the injury sustained does not promote the fair and efficient resolution of
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claims.
Currently, trial lawyers may address the jury on the amount of
damages that it should award. These submissions provide the jury with
some guidance on what is fair and just compensation for the injuries
claimed in the case. But these submissions are not enough. The trial
judge also should suggest to the jury what is reasonable compensation
for the plaintiffs injury, albeit by giving the jury a band or range within
which awards would be fair and just compensation.
The range method is currently used by English courts in
defamation and other civil cases tried to a jury. As applied in England,
the process results in juries making like awards for like injuries in like
cases and thus smoothes out the variability inherent in different juries'
making awards in different cases involving what is essentially the same
injury. New York trial judges should apply the English approach to the
trial of personal-injury cases and give the jury a bracket within which it
may make an award of damages.
II. NEW YORK PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES
The right to a trial by jury in a civil case is governed by the New
York Constitution, which provides that "[t]rial by jury in all cases in
which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision
shall remain inviolate forever." 1 The New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules also governs and provides that the "issues of fact shall be tried by
a jury" in "an action in which a party demands and sets forth facts
which would permit a judgment for a sum of money only." 2 These
provisions cover the trial of almost all personal-injury negligence claims
in which equitable relief is not requested because they inevitably seek a
"sum of money only. " 3
The vast majority of personal-injury cases in New York are
decided by a jury. But they are not tried in such as way that the jury
receives any meaningful guidance on what the plaintiffs personal injury
is worth. Instead, it receives direction on the plaintiffs lost earnings,
medical expenses, or other financial losses.
Instructing a Jury on Damages in a Typical Personal-Injury Case
The trial judge's instructions to the jury, in a typical personalinjury case, provide the jury with no real guidance on the amount of

1. N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 2; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101[1] (McKinney 1992).
2. Id.
3. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 1992).
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damages that should be awarded solely for the plaintiffs injury.
Typically, a charge on damages begins with the admonition that the
instructions on "damages must not be taken as a suggestion that [the
jury] should find for the plaintiff." 4 The trial judge then tells the jury,
"If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant,
you must render a verdict in a sum of money that will justly and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for all losses resulting from the injuries [he]
sustained. " 5
In the usual case, the injury claimed by the plaintiff will have
caused pain and suffering. The judge will instruct the jury as follows:
If you decide that defendant is liable, plaintiff is entitled to recover a
sum of money which will justly and fairly compensate [him] for any
injury and conscience pain and suffering to date caused by defendant.
Conscience pain and suffering means pain and suffering of which
there was some level of awareness by plaintiff. 6

If the plaintiff has testified to a loss of enjoyment of life, the trial judge
will supplement the charge with further instructions. 7
The jury will not be told what the plaintiffs injury is worth. In
closing arguments to the jury, attorneys may suggest what amount of
damages should be awarded. 8 But the suggested amount of damages
must fall within the amount demanded in the complaint and must not
misrepresent the way in which the jury should arrive at its award. 9 This
is the extent of instruction the jurors will receive on the value of an
injury.
Absent guidance on what an injury is worth, it is not surprising that
part of a civil case is devoted to whether the jury's award is either
inadequate or excessive. 10 This examination of fair and just
compensation for the claimed injuries occurs only after the jury has
returned its verdict. By instructing the jury on a permissible range of
awards, jurors are able to make an informed decision that more

4. Pattern Jury Instructions 2:277 [hereinafter P.J.I.].
5. Id.
6. P.J.I. 2:280.
7. P.J.I. 2:280.1.
8. Tate v. Colabello, 445 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 1983); Baker v. Shepard, 715
N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-87 (App. Div. 2000).
9. Acunto v. Conklin, 687 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (App. Div. 1999). See Stangl v.
Compass Transp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that trial counsel may
not suggest "that the measure of damages should be based on the jurors' experience and
financial status"); DeCicco v. Methodist Hosp., 424 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 1980)
(asserting that counsel may not use time-unit argument).
10. See David D. Siegel, New York Civil Practice§ 407 (3d. ed. 1999).
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accurately corresponds to the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Review ofJury Awards under Section 5501 (c) of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules
Judicial review of the inadequacy or excessiveness of a jury's
verdict in New York is conducted indirectly. The right to a jury trial in
actions at law is guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. I I To
protect the right to a jury trial, a court reviewing a jury's award of
damages for inadequacy or excessiveness may not alter the amount. 12
Instead, the court's sole power is to grant a new trial unless, as the case
may be, the defendant stipulates to an increased award or the plaintiff
stipulates to a decreased award. I3 Absent such a stipulation, the court is
limited to granting a retrial.
Requiring consent to either an increase or a reduction in a jury's
award of damages as a means of preserving the right to a trial by jury is
close to a legal fiction. Were a party to refuse to consent to the increase
of an award against it (or the decrease of an award in its favor), the
party would be forced to retry its claim. If the second jury were to
make the same award, the court would grant another trial, absent a
stipulation to the greater or lesser amount already set by the court. If
the second jury returned a different award, the court likely would grant
a new trial if the award was less (or more) than the amount previously
stipulated by the court.
A defendant, or plaintiff, faced with an order granting a new trial,
unless it stipulates to an increased (or reduced) award of damages, has
every incentive to agree to the stipulation. Moreover, a party that is
dissatisfied with the trial judge's conditional order granting a new trial
runs a risk by taking an appeal. In the event that either party appeals,
the appellate division may reinstate the jury's award or decrease the
award to an amount not less than that in the verdict. 14 The traditional
rule in New York was that a court could not set aside a jury's verdict on
damages unless the jury's award was so inadequate or excessive as to

11. See N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 2.
12. Siegel, supra note 10, at 658. ("[T]he court cannot raise or lower the sum directly,
at least not in personal injury and like cases involving unliquidated damages, because the
setting of damages is strictly a jury function").
13. Id. ("[T]he court can grant a new trial 'unless' the defendant stipulates to a higher
sum ('additur') or the plaintiff stipulates to a lower one ('remittitur').").
14. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)[5] (McKinney Supp. 2003) ("[W]hen the final judgment
was entered in a different amount pursuant to the respondent's stipulation on a motion to set
aside the verdict as excessive or inadequate; the appellate court may increase such judgment
to a sum not exceeding the verdict or reduce it to a sum not less than the verdict").
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"shock the conscience of the court." 15 The practical effect of this
standard was that a jury's award of damages would not result in
granting of a new trial unless the award greatly exceeded (or fell below)
any award that a reasonable jury might return. Court-ordered changes
to juries' verdicts did occur, however seldom.
Recognition in the early 1980s that juries were awarding damages
out of proportion to the injuries sustained in personal-injury and similar
tort actions led the New York Legislature to alter the standard under
which a court determined whether an award was either inadequate or
excessive. 16 The former shocks-the-conscience-of-the-court" standard
was replaced in 1986 by a statutory command that in personal-injury
(and some other) actions "the appellate division shall determine that an
award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation." 17 The statute as drafted only
empowered the appellate division to test the inadequacy or
excessiveness of an award by asking whether it deviated materially
from reasonable compensation. 18 Courts soon construed the new
statutory standard to apply to trial courts to avoid the anomalous
situation in which the trial judge would apply a different standard from
the appellate court in reviewing the adequacy of a jury's award. 19
The legislative change in the standard of review did not affect the
procedure that the court used to review the adequacy of the jury's
award. The court could not substitute what it thought was a proper
award for the jury's verdict. The court was limited to granting a new
trial unless, in the case of an inadequate award, the defendant stipulated
to an increased sum; or, in the case of an excessive award, the plaintiff
stipulated to a reduced award. 20

15. See Christopher v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 565 N.E.2d 1266 (N.Y. 1990).
16. See Memorandum of Governor Cuomo on Approving L. 1986, ch. 682, reprinted in
1986 N.Y. Laws at 3182, 3184; see also Memorandum of Office of Court Administration on
Law 1986, Toxic Torts Statute of Limitations, ch. 682, reprinted in 1986 N.Y. Laws 3392.
17. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501 (McKinney Supp. 2003). Strictly speaking, the legislation
applied to cases "in which an itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven"
of the C.P.L.R. Id. Rule 4111, in tum, requires an itemized verdict in medical, dental, and
podiatric malpractice actions, in actions against public employers, and in actions to recover
damages for personal injuries, property damage, and wrongful death. Id. at 411 l(d)-(f). So
review of damages awards by juries in those actions is subject to the deviates-materiallyfrom-reasonable-compensation standard. Id.
18. C.P.L.R. 5501(c).
19. See, e.g., Ashton v. Brobruitsky, 625 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586 (App. Div. 1995); Ramos
v. New York, 565 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 577 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y.
1991).
20. See, e.g., Ashton, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
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The legislative change in the standard of review for jury awards in
personal-injury actions resulted in less reluctance by the courts to
determine the reasonableness of a jury's award of damages. Baker v.
Shepard is typical of hundreds of cases. 21 In that action, the plaintiff, a
passenger in a car, sued to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. 22 The plaintiff claimed that she
"sustained a left humerus fracture that was slow to heal, cervical strain
of the neck, impingement syndrome of the shoulder causing pain and a
deformity that prevented her from fully extending her arm. " 2 The jury
found the defendant at fault and awarded the plaintiff $7500 for her past
pain and suffering but made no award for future pain and suffering. 24
The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, and the trial judge ordered a
new trial to determine the plaintiffs future pain and suffering. 25
On appeal, the Third Department rejected the defendant's
contention that the trial judge improperly set aside the jury's verdict for
future pain and suffering. 26 It reviewed the unopposed medical
testimony presented by the plaintiffs physician and concluded that the
jury's failure to award damages for future pain and suffering deviated
materially from what would be reasonable compensation. 27 Though the
court could have substituted an award for the jury's failure to make one,
it did not. 28 The Third Department also held "that the jury's award of
$7 ,500 for past pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what
would be reasonable compensation. " 29
The Body ofJudicial Evaluations ofPersonal-Injury Awards

Since the legislature's amendment of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules to provide for closer judicial scrutiny of awards by juries in
personal-injury cases, the courts have decided many cases involving the
inadequacy or excessiveness of monetary awards. Several publishers
collect these decisions and make them available by subscription. 30 By
reviewing the decisions of the appellate divisions, it is not difficult to
21. Baker v. Shepard, 715 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2000).
22. Id. at 84-85.
23. Id. at 86.
24. Id. at 85 .
25. Id.
26. Baker, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
27. Id.
28. C.P.L.R. 5501(c).
29. Baker, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
30. See New York Jury Verdict Reporter (Moran Publ'g Co.)(published weekly) and
New York Judicial Review of Damages (Moran Publ'g Co.)(published monthly).
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place an upper and lower limit on the damages that might be awarded
for any personal injury.
For example, the First Department ordered a new trial in a case
involving a tom meniscus followed by two surgeries unless the
defendant stipulated to increase the jury's award from $68,000 to
$200,000. 31 In another case involving a tom meniscus followed by two
surgeries, the same court reversed a trial judge's granting a new trial
unless the plaintiff stipulated to reduce the jury's award of damages
from $600,000 to $225,000. 32 These decisions support a reasonablecompensation bracket of between $200,000 and $600,000 for a case
involving a tom medial meniscus followed by two surgeries.
This analysis of appellate-court decisions to set a reasonablecompensation bracket consisting of an upper and lower limit for any
injury can be performed for just about any injury. Indeed, lawyers in
personal-injury cases devote much effort, both in the trial court and on
appeal, contesting whether the jury's award of damages is either
inadequate or excessive under the materially-deviates-from-reasonablecompensation standard.
The legal argument over reasonable compensation should take
place before the trial judge instructs the jury so that the jury can be
given guidance in the court's charge on what is reasonable
compensation for the claimed injuries. The current English practice in
jury trials is illustrative. How the English courts developed their
approach is instructive.
III. ENGLISH PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES

Before 1854, all cases tried in England in the common-law courts
were heard by a judge sitting with a jury. 33 In that year, Parliament
provided that a common-law action could be tried without a jury with
the parties' consent. 34 The reorganization of the courts during the 1870s
to accommodate the merger of law and equity led to a decline in using
juries in civil actions. 35
31. See Juliano v. Prudential Sec., 731N.Y.S.2d142, 144 (App. Div. 2001).
32. See Garcia v. Queens Surface Corp., 707 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 2000).
33. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 210
(Butterworth 5th ed. 1956) (The common law courts were Queen's Bench, Exchequer, and
Common Pleas.); TERENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS,~ 7.6.1, at 219 (Oxford
U. Press 8th ed. 2000).
34. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet., c. 125, § 1 (Eng.); INGMAN,
supra note 33, ~ 7.6.1, at 219.
35. INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.6.1, at 219. Specifically, section 57 of the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act 1873 allowed the court to deny a trial by jury in civil cases that
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The modem practice of restricting jury trials to claims for libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and fraud may be
traced to a shortage of jurors at the end of World War 1. 36 The Rules of
the Supreme Court had provided since 1883 that "except in a case of
slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or
breach of promise" a jury trial would be held only if ordered by the
court. 37 The Juries Act 1918 then restricted jury trials to that class of
cases, though the act allowed the court to order a jury trial if
necessary. 38 After a handful of other enactments that extended and then
restricted civil jury trials, in 1933 Parliament, "as part of a more general
drive for cheaper litigation," limited jury trials in the High Court to
cases based on either "a charge of fraud against that party" or "a claim
in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment,
seduction or breach of promise of marriage. " 39 The Supreme Court Act
1981 currently governs a party's right to a jury trial and carries this
scheme forward with the notable exception of claims for seduction and
breach of promise, which have been abolished. 40
The Supreme Court Act 1981 permits a judge in the Queen's
Bench Division to order a jury trial in other cases, such as personalinjury negligence actions. 41 The Court of Appeal has so restricted the
High Court's discretion to empanel a jury in negligence cases that, as a
practical matter, jury trials are not held. 42 Moreover, the overriding
objective of the Civil Procedure Rules is to take up an appropriate share
of the court's resources and deal with a case in a way that is

required prolonged examination of accounts, documents, or scientific or local examination.
See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Viet., c. 66, § 57 (Eng.).
36. GEOFFREY WILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 181
(1973).
37. Id.
38. See Juries Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.).
39. WILSON, supra note 36, at 181; see Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 6 (Eng.).
40. See Supreme Court Act 1981, c. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.); see Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, c. 33, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.).
41. See Supreme Court Act 1981, c. 54, § 69(3). Section 69(3) of the act provides that
"[a]n action to be tried in the Queen's Bench Division which does not by virtue of
subsection (1) fall to be tried with a jury shall be tried without a jury unless the court in its
discretion orders it to be tried with a jury."
42. See INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.6.3, at 221-23. Indeed, in the most recent judgment
to deal with the trial judge's discretion to order a jury trial in a personal-injury action, the
Court of Appeal commented that "no jury trial of a claim for personal injuries appears to
have taken place for over 25 years." See H. v. Ministry of Defence, [1991] 2 Q.B. 103, 112
(Eng. C.A. 1991). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the trial judge's order
directing a trial by jury and ordered a "trial by judge alone." Id. at 111-12.
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proportionate to the amount involved and to the case's importance. 43
In England, one consequence of trying personal-injury claims
before a judge and not a jury has been the development of a body of
decisional authority that discusses the value of various personal injuries.
The courts have attempted to make similar awards of damages for
similar injuries. The leading decision of the Court of Appeal on the
right to a jury trial on a personal-injury claim turned on the premise that
this scheme of like awards for like injuries should be maintained
through judge trials. 44 The court reasoned that this well-developed body
of case law on the value of injuries would be upset were juries to make
awards of damages in personal-injury cases. 45
At common law, neither the trial court nor the appellate court
could review an issue of fact decided by a jury.46 But the court could
order a new trial by setting aside the jury's verdict. 47 In time, this
indirect review of a jury's verdict led to the court's "fix[ing] its own
figure ... without ordering a new trial" when the damages "awarded by
the jury were manifestly too high or too low."48 The court's power to
set aside a jury's award of damages was very limited. If the trial judge
had properly instructed the jury, "it [was] not for the members of the
Court of Appeal to seek to substitute their assessment and their
judgment for that of the jury. "49 "The Court of Appeal [could] not
interfere if the figure [was] one which a jury, acting properly, might
award. " 50 Only if the verdict was "so excessive or so inadequate that no
twelve reasonable jurors could reasonably have awarded it; or, stated
otherwise ... [so] out of all proportion to the circumstances of the case"
could the Court of Appeal set it aside. 51
The Court of Appeal's power to set aside a verdict and order a new
trial continued to disallow the court to reassess an irrational award of

43. Civ. P.R. 1.1(2) (2001) (Eng.); BLACKSTONE'S CIVIL PRACTICE, ~ 58.4 at 723
(Charles Plant et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 2003).
44. See Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 303 (Eng. C.A. 1965).
45. Id. The court reasoned that the assessment of damages in personal-injury cases had
been developed such that the courts awarded like sums for like injuries. See id. at 296. To
continue this scheme of like awards for like injuries, the trial judge would be required to
give the jury upper and lower limits for compensation such that "you might as well let the
judge assess the figures himself." Id. at 303. Under the circumstances, "there is little point
in having a jury at all." Id.
46. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 131.
47. Id. at 135.
48. Id.
49. Scott v. Musial, [1959] 2 Q.B. 429, 437 (Eng. C.A. 1959).
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id.

Published by SURFACE, 2004

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2004], Art. 2
10

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 31: 1

damages. 52 The Court of Appeal could reduce or increase a jury's
award in lieu of granting a new trial with the consent of the parties. 53
Section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990

By the 1980s, concern emerged that juries' awards in defamation
actions "appear[ ed] to have got completely out of hand. " 54 The Court of
Appeal had very limited authority to set aside a jury's award of
damages and almost no power to order a reasonable award of damages
in place of a new trial. Parliament responded by including in the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990 a section providing for the Court of
Appeal "to have power, in place of ordering a new trial, to substitute for
the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be
proper."55 This section applied to those cases "where the Court of
Appeal has power to order a new trial on the ground that damages
awarded by a jury are excessive or inadequate." 56 The rules of court
were amended to provide the following:
In any case where the Court of Appeal has power to order a new trial
on the ground that damages awarded by a jury are excessive or
inadequate, the court may, instead of ordering a new trial, substitute
for the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be
proper. 57

The Court of Appeal's power to substitute an award of damages for the
amount awarded in the jury's verdict was novel. But ramifications of
this change were yet to be felt.
Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. was the first case to
explore the significance of the change enacted by Parliament. Rantzen
was a libel action brought by a television personality against a
newspaper. 58 Rantzen had been tried like other libel cases before it. In
his instructions to the jury, the trial judge stated that neither he nor
counsel could suggest to the jury what measure of damages would be
appropriate. 59 He also explained "that he was not permitted to tell them
52. INGMAN, supra note 33, ~ 7.9.2, at 232.
53. Id.
54. Id.~ 7.9.2, at 228-29.
55. Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 8(2) (Eng.).
56. Id.§ 8(1).
57. R.S.C. Order 59, Rule 11(4) (2000) (Eng.). The new Civil Procedure Rules
provide: "In an appeal from a claim tried with a jury the Court of Appeal may, instead of
ordering a new trial, (a) make an order for damages; or (b) vary an award of damages made
by the jury." Civ. P.R. 52.10(3) (2001) (Eng.).
58. Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., [1994] Q.B. 670 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
59. Id. at 681.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss1/2

10

Cole: Charging the Jury on Damages in Personal-Injury Cases: How New Yo

2004]

Charging the Jury on Damages

11

by way of comparison what awards are received by a plaintiff who has
been totally or partially paralysed... or who has lost a limb." 60 The trial
judge's charge on damages continued:
The figure you come up with, if you get to that point, must be a fair
and reasonable one. It must not be miserly otherwise suspicion will
linger. On the other hand, the figure must not be wildly excessive. Be
reasonable. Keep your feet on the ground. In so arriving at a figure
you are entitled to take into account the value of money, what it can
cost to buy a house, a car, or a holiday . . .You will arrive at a
reasonable figure having balanced out the factors which you think may
aggravate and so increase the figure and mitigate and so reduce the
figure.61

Despite this admonition, the jury awarded £250,000 in damages, a
considerable award. 62 The newspaper af pealed and argued that the
jury's award of damages was excessive. 6 The newspaper contended
that the jury made an excessive award because the trial judge had not
provided the jury with any guidance on what amount of damages to
award. 64
The Court of Appeal first recognized the almost limitless discretion
accorded to a jury's verdict was no longer satisfactory in light of the
court's power to substitute its award of damages for that of the jury.65
Instead, the Court of Appeal then decided to analyze the jury's award of
damages by asking, "Could a reasonable jury have thought that this
award was necessary to compensate the plaintiff and to re-establish his
reputation?"66 The court then asked whether a trial judge, in summing
up, should provide the jury with further guidance on what sum of
damages to award. 67 It noted that a juror in another case had written
about his misgivings over the absence of any real guidance in awarding
damages:
It is no betrayal of the secrets of the jury room to confess that, with

other jurors, I entered the Royal Courts of Justice on 14 June with not
the remotest idea of what compensation is paid for anything except
perhaps a dented boot and wing; haloes are outside the normal terms
of reference. Apparently that is why we were asked. If that is so, the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 681 .
Id. at 681 - 82.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 673 .
Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 692-93.

Published by SURFACE, 2004

11

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2004], Art. 2

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

12

[Vol. 31:1

court had the outcome it deserved from the appointed procedure. 68

The Court of Appeal saw three possible sources of guidance for the
jury: (1) other awards of juries in defamation cases, (2) awards made by
a court in personal-injury cases, and (3) awards made by the Court of
Appeal in defamation cases when it substituted its award of damages for
that of the jury. 69 It rejected out of hand the argument that the trial
judge should refer the jury to awards made by other juries. 70 The Court
of Appeal also concluded "that there is no satisfactory way in which the
conventional awards in actions for damages for personal injuries can be
used to provide guidance for an award in an action for defamation." 71
The court found that awards of the Court of Appeal, presumably in
defamation cases, "stand on a different footing." 72 The court foresaw a
time when a sufficient body of law would develop from its review of
jury verdicts in defamation cases so that the trial judge could instruct
the jury on awards in like cases. 73 The Court of Appeal reasoned "that
it must have been the intention of the framers of the 1990 Act that over
a period of time the awards made by the Court of Appeal would provide
a corpus to which reference could be made in subsequent cases."74 The
decisions of the Court of Appeal could then be relied on by the trial
judge as establishing reasonable awards in summing up to the jury. 75
Meanwhile, the process of instructing the jury on damages was left
in place. 76 The jury could be told to consider the purchasing power of
any award that it might make. 77 Moreover, the trial judge could remind
the jury "that any award they make [should be] proportionate to the
damage which the plaintiff has suffered and is a sum which it is
necessary to award him to provide adequate compensation and to reestablish his reputation." 78
John v. MGN Ltd.

The Court of Appeal's approach in the Rantzen case left "judges

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 693 (quoting THE TIMES, June 15, 1976).
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694.
Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 696.
Rantzen, [1994] Q.B. at 696.
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presiding over defamation trials with juries to confine their jury
directions to a statement of general principles, eschewing any specific
guidance on the appropriate level of general damages in the particular
case." But within two years time, the Court of Appeal recognized "its
practical disadvantages ha[d] become ever more manifest." 79
A series of jury awards disproportionate to any damage
conceivably suffered by the plaintiff had given rise to serious and
justified criticism of the procedures leading to such awards. 80 Judges
were limited to giving the jury broad directions of general principle
coupled with instructions to be "reasonable."81 Yet, judges gave no
guidance on what might be thought reasonable or unreasonable; and it is
not altogether surprising that juries lacked an instinctive sense of where
to pitch their awards. They were, in the words of the Court of Appeal,
in the position of sheep let loose on an unfenced common with no
shepherd. 82
John v. MGN Ltd. was a libel action brought by the well-known
performer, Elton John, stemming from an article published in the
Sunday Mirror. 83 The jury awarded £350,000 in damages. 84 On appeal,
the newspaper's counsel, the same lawyer who had appeared for the
newspaper on the Rantzen appeal, again suggested that trial judges and
counsel should be allowed to tell juries about awards of general
damages in personal-injury cases. 85
The Court of Appeal was persuaded that the guidance being given
to juries in defamation actions deserved reconsideration. 86 The starting
point was the court's recognizing that a trial, whether by judge or by
jury, should give a successful claimant "appropriate compensation, that
is, compensation which is neither too much nor too little. " 87 That said,
nothing justified the stream "of libel awards in sums which appear so
large as to bear no relation to the ordinary values of life. " 88
Overgenerous awards were unjust to defendants, encouraged claimants
to regard a successful libel claim "as a road to untaxed riches," and

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

John v. MGN Ltd., (1997] Q.B. 586, 60.8 (Eng. C.A. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597.
John, [1997] Q.B. at 597.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
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failed to command respect. 89
Four possible reforms were explored: (1) referring to jury awards
in comparable actions for defamation; (2) referring to awards either
approved by or substituted by the Court of Appeal in defamation cases;
(3) referring to awards of damages in personal-injury actions; and (4)
allowing counsel to suggest the appropriate award, when coupled with
the trial judge's guidance on the appropriate bracket. 90
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that juries should not be instructed
on previous defamation awards by other juries because "[t]hose awards
will have been made in the absence of specific guidance by the judge
and may themselves be very unreliable markers."91 The Court also
repeated its holding in Rantzen: the trial judge could refer to awards in
defamation cases either made by or approved by the Court of Appeal. 92
The court was quick to point out that a body of such awards had not
been, and would not be, quickly established. 93 Meanwhile, another
approach had to be found.
The Court of Appeal took a second look at the only other
alternative: awards of damages in personal-injury cases. It held that
"judges and counsel, should be free to draw the attention of juries to
these comparisons. " 94 These awards would not be relied on as any
exact guide, and, of course, there could be no precise correlation
between loss of a limb, or of sight, or quadriplegia, and damage to
reputation. 95
[T]hese personal injuries ... command conventional awards of, at most,
about £52,000, £90,000 and £125,000 for pain and suffering and loss
of amenity ... , juries may properly be asked to consider whether the
injury to his reputation of which the plaintiff complains should fairly
justify any greater compensation... .It is in our view offensive to
public opinion, and rightly so, that a defamation plaintiff should
recover damages for injury to reputation greater, perhaps by a
significant factor, than if the same plaintiff had been rendered a
helpless cripple or an insensate vegetable. 96

In summing up to the jury, both the trial judge and counsel would
89. John, [1997] Q.B. at 611.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 611-12. The Court of Appeal left open the possibility that it could reconsider
a trial judge's ability to mention jury awards in comparable cases in the future. Id. at 612.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. John, [ 1997] Q.B. at 614.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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be able to indicate to the jury the amount that it should consider in
reaching the verdict. 97 Despite these suggestions, jurors should be
reminded that the final decision on the amount of damages is theirs
alone to make. 98

Thompson v. Commissioner ofPolice of the Metropolis
The scheme set out by the Court of Appeal in the John case-that
the trial judge should instruct the jury on awards in personal-injury
cases during the summing up in a defamation case-soon was extended
to claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In
Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, the Court of
Appeal had before it appeals in two cases involving claims for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. 99 In each case, the trial judge
gave the jury only general instructions on the amount of damages that it
might award. The issue on appeal was whether the approach taken in
the John case, referring the jury to awards in personal-injury cases
should be applied in jury trials of false-imprisonment and maliciousprosecution claims. 100 The claimants' counsel argued that referring a
jury to personal-injury awards, which arise out of negligence rather than
deliberate acts, does not assist a jury in deciding a police-abuse case. 101
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal agreed that, because the
Rantzen and John cases were defamation actions, it did not follow that
the approach taken in those cases could be applied directly to other
actions.102 Nonetheless, the court held that the approach set out in the
John case for instructing the jury on the damages recoverable by the
claimant would apply to false-imprisonment, malicious-prosecution,
and other civil actions tried to a jury. 103 "Once section 8 of the Act has
been given one interpretation as to one category of cases that
interpretation must apply across the board. It is difficult to see how the
same words can have different meanin§s depending upon the type of
action to which they are being applied." 1 4
The Court of Appeal set forth the approach that the trial judge was

97. John, [1997] Q.B. at 615.
98. Id. at 616.
99. Thompson v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498 (Eng. C.A.
1996).
100. Id. at 502.
101. Id. at 503.
102. Id. at 511.
103. Id. at 511-512.
104. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 511-12.
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to take in instructing the jury at the close of arguments. 105 First, the trial
judge should explain to the jury that the only relief, it may grant is an
award of damages intended to compensate the plaintiff for injuries, and
not to punish the defendant. 106 Next, the trial judge should give the jury
"an appropriate bracket to use as a starting point." 107 The trial judge
should decide on the bracket after considering the submissions of
counsel. 108 The trial judge also should give the jury an appropriate
upper limit for its award of damages. 109 Finally, the jury should be told
that these figures "are no more than guideline figures based on the
judge's experience and on the awards in other cases and the actual
figure is one on which they must decide." 110
The John and Thompson judgments have allowed English trial
judges to provide guidance to juries in civil cases on the amount of
damages that may constitute an appropriate award. A typical instruction
may present the jury with a wide range within which to grant the award.
An example of such an instruction is as follows:
At the top end in a case of this kind you might think that an award of
£150,000, something of that order, might be justified. At the lower
end-but it all depends, really, on your view of the evidence. If you
were to conclude that this is a case where a significant part of the
defence of justification has been made good even if the defence does
not succeed, then you might want to come up with a very small award
indeed, I do not know. So the lower end of the bracket comes quite
low if riou feel that to a significant extent the case has not been
proved. 11

In other instances, such as police-abuse cases in which the injuries are
typically slight, the ranges might be as narrow as only a few hundred
pounds. 112
Kiam v. MGN Ltd.
In the John appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that the jury

105. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 514-17.
106. Id. at 514.
107. Id. at 515.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 515.
111. Grobbelaar v. New Group Newspapers Ltd., [2002] 1 W.L.R. 3024, 3028 (U.K.
H.L. 2002).
112. See, e.g., Watson v. Chief Constable of Cleveland Police, [2001] EWCA Civ.
1547, at ,-i 36 (Eng. C.A.); Hill v. Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis, unreported,
Transcript Nov. 4, 1998 at ,-i,-i 10 & 13 (Eng. C.A. 1998).
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was not bound by the trial judge's upper and lower limits in making an
award of damages. 113 The court suggested that, if the jury were to
return an award outside the suggested bracket, "real weight must be
given to the possibility that their judgment is to be preferred to that of
the trial judge." 114
In Kiam v. MGN, Ltd., Victor Kiam, the purchaser of Remington,
sued the publisher of The Mirror for defamation. 115 In the instructions
to the jury, the trial judge mentioned that general damages for a
personal-injury claim would rarely exceed £150,000, that £100,000 was
the norm for the loss of both arms, and that £45,000 was typical for the
loss of a hand. 116 In Kiam, the judge instructed the jury as follows:
Now although, as I seek to emphasise, the decision on damages is
yours and yours alone, much may depend on the meanings which you
find that this article bore. But I would suggest that, if you find that the
article bears the more serious defamatory meanings of the kind
suggested by Mr. Kiam, you may think that an award of much less
than £40,000 would not properly reflect the seriousness of the slur on
him, and the subsequent aggravation of the injury to this feelings.
You might also think that an award of more than £75-80,000 might be
considered excessive, given the scale of damages 1enerally. I have to
stress that the decision is yours and yours alone. 11

The jury, nonetheless, awarded £105,000. 118
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the jury's award could be
interfered with only if excessive or inadequate. 119 The proper inquiry
was "whether a reasonable jury could have thought the award necessary
to compensate the claimant and to re-establish his reputation." 120 In
other words, the Court of Appeal "should not interfere with the jury's
award unless it regards it as substantially exceeding the most that any
jury could reasonably have thought appropriate." 121 The bracket
suggested by the trial judge was not irrelevant. 122 The jury's role in
assessing libel damages was such that an award outside the bracket
should not be condemned as '"unreasonable' unless it is out of all

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

John, (1997] Q.B. at 616.

Id.
Kiam v. MGN, Ltd., (2003] Q.B. 281 (Eng. C.A. 2002).

Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 298.
Kiam, (2003] Q.B. at 298.

Id.
Id. at 298-99.
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proportion to what could sensibly have been thought appropriate." 123
IV.

APPL YING THE ENGLISH PRACTICE IN NEW YORK

The preceding review of the law governing the instruction of juries
and the review of jury awards in civil actions illustrates the magnitude
of the changes made by the Court of Appeal. In the 10 years after
Parliament's enacting the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, the
Court of Appeal replaced a system in which juries were given
practically no help in placing a value on an injury. The Court of
Appeal's new procedure allowed trial counsel to suggest an award of
damages in their closing speeches. The trial judge then provided the
jury with a bracket that included both a floor and ceiling for reasonable
compensation. This system, if employed in New York personal-injury
trials, would be effective.
There are similarities between the practices followed in England
and New York in personal-injury jury trials. The principal similarity is
the power of an appellate court to effectively substitute its award of
damages for that made by the jury. In England, that power is direct.
The "Court of Appeal may, instead of ordering a new trial[,] ... vary an
award of damages made by the jury." 124 But in New York, the court
must order a new trial unless the party affected by the court's decision
to vary the verdict stipulates to either the increase or the decrease in the
jury's award. Another similarity shared by England and New York is
the reviewing court's effective power to substitute its award of damages
for that made by the jury. This practice has led to the development of a
body of decisional authority from which general damages for specific
injuries may be estimated in any case.
The obvious difference between English and New York jury
practice is that in England the use of a civil jury is limited to a handful
of cases and does not include negligence claims, which are the largest
source of personal-injury awards, a difference of degree and not of
kind.A jury trial in New York proceeds much like a jury trial in
England. But an exception is that New York does not follow the
English practice of the trial judges' suggesting (to the jury) a range of
damages for injuries. No rule prohibits a New York trial judge from so
instructing the jury in a civil case. The advantages to such an approach
suggest that it should be adopted.
123. Kiam, [2003] Q.B. at 299.
124. Civ. P.R. 52.10(3) (Eng.); see also Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, §
8(2) (Eng.) ("the Court of Appeal ... to have power, in place of ordering a new trial, to
substitute for the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be proper").
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Comparing Section 5501 (c) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules with
Section 8 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990

The similarities between New York and English practice are most
easily seen in the legislation authorizing an appellate court to substitute
its judgment on damages for that of the jury. Section 5501(c) of New
York's Civil Practice Law and Rules provides that the appellate division
shall review questions of fact and that:
[i]n reviewing a money judgment in [a personal-injury action] in
which it is contended that the award is excessive or inadequate and
that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is
entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that
the award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from
what would be reasonable compensation. 125

Section 8 of England's Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 empowers
the Court of Appeal "to substitute for the sum awarded by the jury such
sum as appears to the court to be proper." 126 England's Civil Procedure
Rules provide that the "Court of Appeal may, instead of ordering a new
trial-( a) make an order for damages; or (b) vary an award of damages
made by the jury." 127
The differences between the English and New York statutes are
insignificant. In both jurisdictions, an appellate court has the power to
set aside the jury's award. Moreover, the standard under which the
court does so in New York, when an award "deviates materially from
what would be reasonable compensation" is not much different from
that applied in England, whether "a reasonable jury [could] have
thought that this award was necessary." 128 Each standard uses
reasonableness as a guide.
The principal difference is that a New York court must substitute
its award of damages for that of the jury under the guise of directing a
new trial. This legal fiction disguises what really is happening: the
court is substituting its award for that made by the jury. No difference
in practice exists between the New York and the English statutory
framework. Therefore, no difference should exist in the way in which
the courts apply their powers to control awards made by juries.

125.
126.
127.
128.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2003).
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 8(2) (Eng.).
Civ. P.R. 52.10(3)(a)-(b) (Eng.).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2003); Rantzen, (1994] Q.B. at 692.
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Judicial Authority Supporting the Trial Court's Charging the Jury on
the Amount ofDamages (How John v. MGN Ltd. Would Be Applied in
New York)

Two strains of authority suggest that the English practice of
charging the jury on fair and just compensation by giving the jury a
reasonable compensation bracket for a personal injury is consistent with
the judge's and jury's role in New York. The first line of authority is
the trial judge's common-law power to comment on the evidence. The
traditional rule provided that a trial judge, as a matter of discretion,
could comment on the evidence in the charge to the jury. 129 The judge's
comments must be proper to guide the jury to a just verdict without
leading the jury or controlling its verdict. 130 The trial judge could
suggest that one version of the evidence would prove negligence while
another version of the events would not. 131 The power to comment on
the evidence is generally no longer used, although trial judges continue
to marshal the evidence for the jury in criminal cases. 132
The second and more modem line of authority allows trial counsel
to suggest to the jury the amount of damages that may be awarded.
Lawyers in New York may include an amount of damages in their
closing arguments if it falls within the damages sought in the action and
if the method for arriving at those damages is consistent with the court's
charge.1 33 It is consistent with this authority to implement the English
practice of charging a jury on damages in New York personal-injury
cases.
The trial judge's historical power to comment on the evidence is
broad enough to support instructing the jury on what range of damages
is appropriate for a specific injury, should the jury find that injury as a
matter of fact. In addition, New York attorneys are currently allowed to
instruct the jury on the amount of their award. The judge is uniquely
positioned to provide the jury with meaningful and unbiased guidance
based on judicially approved awards in other cases. Therefore, judges
should follow the English practice of instructing the jury on reasonable

129. See Poler v. New York Cent. R.R., 16 N.Y. 476, 483 (1857).
130. Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 74 N.Y. 15, 27 (1878).
131. See Drew v. Sixth Ave. R.R., 26 N.Y. 49, 52 (1862).
132. See, e.g., People v. Sargent, 601 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (App. Div.), appeal denied,
624 N.E.2d 1039 (1993); People v. Cross, 570 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (App. Div.), appeal
denied, 580 N.E.2d 416 (1991).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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damages.
Were New York to adopt the English system of a reasonablecompensation bracket, the trial judge's charge on damages in a case
involving a torn medial meniscus followed by two surgeries may
include the following:
If you find that defendant is liable, plaintiff is entitled to recover that
sum of money that will justly and fairly compensate [him] for any
injury and conscience pain and suffering to date caused by defendant.

The decision on damages is yours and yours alone. You should,
however, be aware that the usual compensation for the injury claim by
the plaintiff-a tom medial meniscus followed by two surgical
repairs-falls between $200,000 at a minimum and $600,000 (or
perhaps slightly more) at a maximum. I give you those figures as a
guide. You are not bound by them and may award either a lesser or
greater sum of damages should you find such lesser or greater sum
supported by the evidence. The decision on damages is, I repeat,
yours and yours alone.

Before this charge, the attorneys would have submitted suggested
brackets to the trial judge along with their requests as to the content of
the charge. 134 Attorneys would know before the closing arguments the
bracket that the judge intended to use in the charge. This is opposed to
the current rule under which the lawyers can suggest to the jury, during
the closing of arguments, awards of damages they think are appropriate
for the facts of the particular case.
The Advantages ofAdopting the English Practice

Adopting the English practice in New York presents several
advantages. Were the jury to make an award within the bracket
suggested by the court, it is unlikely that trial counsel would move to set
aside the verdict as either inadequate or excessive. The court would
have set the bracket only after having heard the lawyers on the range of
permissible jury awards. In the usual case, the trial judge would not
examine a verdict within the bracket for either inadequacy or
excessiveness, which would reduce the grounds for a postverdict
motion.
The bracket suggested by trial judge would be based on the
decisions of the appellate divisions in cases presenting similar injuries;
therefore, reducing the probability that an appellate court would
increase or reduce an award within the bracket (absent the trial judge's

134. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4110-b (McKinney 1992).

Published by SURFACE, 2004

21

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2004], Art. 2

22

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 31: 1

assigning an incorrect bracket). The appellate division would also have
the rationale of trial judge on the permissible range of awards in any
appeal. The result of these changes would be fewer appeals contesting
the inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict.
Moreover, even in those cases in which the jury returned a verdict
on damages outside the bracket, the procedural advantages of the
system are apparent. The appellate division would have counsel's
submissions to the trial judge on the proposed bracket, which gives a
clear picture of the permissible range of damages awards.
The principal advantage of the English approach is substantive:
providing like awards for like injuries. In New York, juries are drawn
from different political subdivisions throughout the state. 135 In some
areas, juries are known for generous awards, while, in others, jury
awards are low. Using the English approach and providing the jury with
a suggested range of permissible damages will not change the tendency
of a jury in a particular area to be either more or less generous. It is
suggested that a bracket of permissible damages for an injury should
reduce the disparity in awards for like injuries in different parts of the
state. While a jury must judge each claim on its own merits, scant
justification exists for a jury (which operates as a part of the state court
system) to award different sums for the same injuries.
Adopting the English Practice in State-Law Claims Tried in Federal
Court

The English practice of providing the jury with a suggested range
of verdicts for an injury should be permitted (and applied) in a state-law
based personal-injury claim filed in a court of the United States. Two
possible obstacles exist. First, the right to a jury trial in a common-law
claim is guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. 136
Second, the procedure for instructing a jury at the close of evidence is
governed by federal law. 137
Surprisingly, the constitutional issue is easily overcome. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the Seventh
Amendment is to preserve the "right [to a jury trial] which existed under
the English common law when the Amendment was adopted." 138 Thus,
it "preserve[s] the substance of the common-law right of trial by
jury... and ... retain[s] the common-law distinction between the
135.
136.
137.
138.

N.Y. JUD. L. §§ 500, 510[1], 520 (McKinney Supp. 2003).
See U.S . CONST. amend. VII.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
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province of the court and that of the jury, whereby .. .issues of law are
to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the
jury under appropriate instructions by the court." 139 The Seventh
Amendment does not preserve a particular form of trial or procedure so
long as the judge decides the issues of law and the jury resolves the
Under this construction of the Seventh
questions of fact. 140
Amendment, a trial judge's suggesting a range of damages awards to a
jury would not infringe a litigant's Constitutional right to a jury trial.
The jury would still decide the factual issue of damages, albeit guided
by the trial judge. 141
The more difficult question is whether federal law allows the trial
judge to suggest the range of damages to the jury in the instructions on
damages. Well-established authority suggests that "[i]n charging the
jury, the trial judge may not suggest a proper award by way of allusion
to a particular sum." 142 The power of a federal trial judge to comment
on the evidence is more firmly rooted than is the power of a New York
judge to do so. 143 In this view, the federal trial judge "an active
participant in the trial" whose role is to guide and lead the jury. 144
While a federal trial judge is should not be permitted to mention a
"particular sum" of damages as appropriate, the judge should be
permitted to suggest a range of permissible damages so long as the jury
is reminded that it is the sole trier of fact and is free to disregard the
bracket suggested by the court. 145

139. Baltimore & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657.
140. Id.
141. Cf Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 (1996) (requiring
a federal court to apply C.P.L.R. 5501(c) in the trial and the appeal of a state-law claim
because the section is a substantive rule designed to achieve predictability in awards of
damages in actions tried to a jury).
142. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2556, at 446 (2d ed. 1995).
143. Id. § 2557, at 451; 1 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 7.05, at 498-99 (5th ed. 2000); see, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia &
Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887) ("Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is
a trial presided over by a judge, with authority ... to instruct the jury upon the law, but also,
when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by
explaining and commenting upon the testimony, and even giving them his opinion upon
questions of fact, provided only that he submits those questions to their determination.");
Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886) ("In the courts of the
United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was derived, the judge, in
submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist
them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to
parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinions upon the facts").
144. O'MALLEY, supra note 142, § 7.05, at 499.
145. See id.§ 7.05, at 500--01.
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V. CONCLUSION

If properly applied, the English system of providing the jury with a
reasonable-compensation bracket does not eliminate the jury's role in
awarding damages, a necessarily nuanced and highly individualized
determination in every case. Rather, the trial judge's giving the jury a
bracket with an upper and lower end indicating what is fair and
reasonable compensation in a case should provide the jury with valuable
guidance on what amount of damages is reasonable under the
circumstances of the case. The jury would be free to make a higher or
lower award than that indicated by the bracket, just as it now may make
an award that is higher or lower than that suggested by trial counsel.
If the English practice were properly applied in New York, the
court's suggesting a reasonable-compensation bracket to a jury in a
personal-injury case should lead to the eventual evening out of jury
awards for like injuries throughout the state. In tum, these equitable
awards will be perceived as increasing fairness in the courts by granting
like awards for like injuries. Moreover, litigants and their attorneys will
be better able to assess the jury's likely award in a case because parties
should assume that
... a jury's award of damages will fall inside the
bracket in most cases. Because the jury's award is apt to fall inside the
bracket, the number of postverdict motions to set aside the verdict for
inadequacy or excessiveness (and appeals from orders on those
motions) would be reduced. In other words, much would be gained by
the adoption of the English practice of providing the jury with a
reasonable-compensation bracket in New York in personal-injury cases.
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